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Chapter 17
Lawfare
Charles J. Dunlap Jr.
In this chapter:
Introduction to the Concept of Lawfare
Introduction to the Concept of Lawfare
The concept of lawfare continues to evolve and proliferate.1 At the time of its modern
incarnation in 2001,2 an Internet search would have revealed only a handful of references
but, as noted below, that number had risen to 60,000 by 2009. Today, however, it would
produce hundreds of thousands of results.3 Lawfare today not only persists as a key aspect
of asymmetrical conflicts involving non-state actors, but has also become the weapon of
choice for the U.S. government’s efforts to unwind the financial underpinnings of terrorist
organizations.
And there is more: private plaintiffs are now waging a form of courtroom lawfare by
using novel legal theories to sue (in U.S. courts) banks that are alleged to have helped
finance terrorist operations. At the same time, in 2010 the Supreme Court endorsed what
is, in reality, a counter-lawfare technique by sustaining the criminalization of legal advice
(and legal training) if provided to designated terrorist organizations.
Technology has also impacted lawfare. As cyber incidents grow in frequency and seri-
ousness, lawfare considerations (albeit not necessarily by that appellation) are increasingly
taking center stage. Yet perhaps the most dramatic development in lawfare is the rising
number of countries— to include such global powers as China and the Russian Federa-
tion— which are embracing lawfare tactics in their kinetic and non-kinetic confrontations
with nation-state opponents.
The 2009 article that follows Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st Century Conflicts?4
remains a useful primer on the modern concept of lawfare. The purpose of this introduction
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is to provide an overview of some of the lawfare-related issues that have arisen since that
time. And, as already indicated, there have been a number of significant developments.
Among other things, the 2009 article highlighted lawfare issues arising from the conflict
between Israel and Hamas in the 2008-2009 timeframe. Tragically, that conflict re-ignited
in 2014, and it demonstrates that lawfare remains a central tenet of the strategy of both
sides. As this writer observed in 2014:
[I]n the present conflict, Hamas and Israel have sought to assign the other blame
for the rising numbers of civilian casualties in an obvious effort to convince
world opinion as to who is acting unlawfully and, therefore, gain support around
the world.
Hamas expertly wages lawfare by effectively publicizing the deaths of civilians as
a result of deliberate Israeli attacks on them. Israelis counter by charging that
Hamas is responsible since it operates amid civilians contrary to international
law. In addition, Israelis insist that many civilian deaths are the result of Hamas
rockets malfunctioning and falling onto Gaza.5
Israel clearly had superiority with respect to traditional military means, but Hamas
seemed to have had the lawfare edge, at least initially.6 However, before that contest ended,
Israeli counter-lawfare techniques (and Hamas overreaching), may have re-balanced the
lawfare scales Israel’s way.7 Regardless, this 2014 conflict shows that lawfare is alive and
well in the 21st century.
While the description of lawfare (“the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute
for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective”) used in the 2009 article
still resonates, it has evolved over the years.8 Recent developments suggest that perhaps a
further adjustment is in order. One expression might be to simply identify lawfare as the
use of law as a means of accomplishing what would otherwise require the application of
force, or as a means of facilitating the same. So defined, the utility of the term lawfare
can extend to circumstances that may not always amount to “war” or, as many prefer,
“armed conflict.”9
Indeed, the most active growth area of lawfare is not as directly associated with traditional
battlefields as it might be said about the term’s original formulation. For example, in his
book, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare, Juan Zarate relates
how the U.S.  Treasury used a variety of laws to “attack” the financial architecture of
terrorists and other 21st century adversaries.
Importantly, Professor John Norton Moore, one of the authors of this textbook, was
an early advocate of using what could be characterized as a lawfare methodology— civil
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litigation— to fight terrorism.10 That advocacy is beginning to bear fruit as the 2014
Eastern District of New York case of Linde v. Arab Bank Plc resulted in the first U.S. verdict
holding a bank liable “in a civil suit under a broad antiterrorism statute.”11 Specifically, a
New York jury found that the Arab Bank, a Jordanian institution, “helped Hamas militants
carry out a wave of violence in Israel that killed and wounded hundreds of Americans.”12
Cases of this sort may become a key lawfare “tool” to “attack” the ability of terrorists to
obtain financing.
Yet at the same time there also has been a disquieting development in the use of the
law as a counter-terrorism weapon. In the 2010 case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project13 the Supreme Court held, inter alia,  that providing legal advice or even teaching
law to designated terrorist organizations amounted to providing material support to
terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C §2339. It mattered not that the intent of the Humanitarian
Law Project was simply to get the designated organizations to give up violence and “use
humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes.”14
That ostensibly benign intent evidently did not sway the Court. Though they did not
use the term “lawfare,” the Court did illustrate how terrorists might pervert the law by
explaining that:
A foreign terrorist organization introduced to the structures of the international
legal system might use the information to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.
This possibility is real, not remote.15
Still, this holding is troubling not just because of the Court’s (and, really, Congress’)
evidently low opinion of the international legal system’s ability to deal with persons who
might attempt to abuse the law, but also because the criminalization of an effort to get a
group to use the law to resolve disputes peacefully prevents the use of a well-accepted and
proven means of ending otherwise intractable hostilities.16 Moreover, most court systems
have, or need to have, procedures in place to deal with any litigant who might seek to use
the law to “threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.” Denying the ability to try to use this kind of
lawfare technique to defang a violent adversary is not just puzzling, it is counterproductive.
Importantly, while the article below talks mainly about the use of lawfare in situations
involving non-state actors in non-international armed conflicts, it is becoming increasingly
clear that nation-states either have employed lawfare, or will employ it as a means and
method of warfare. For example, China has developed a rather sophisticated understanding
of how law might be used in future conflict.17
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Furthermore,  in the ongoing dispute over the control of maritime areas (and the
resources they might contain) in the South China Sea, China has used the law to reinforce
its claims, while at the same time establishing a military presence.18 Similarly, the Philippines
and other nations which are unable to challenge China militarily, are using a variety of
juridical methodologies to launch their own legal attacks. It remains to be seen who will
emerge as the victor in what may be the first major lawfare conflict of the 21st century.19
China is not alone in its effort to become a lawfare power. Although some scholars
believe the Russian Federation (and the Soviets before them) have long employed lawfare
strategies,20 it is undisputed that what might be called lawfare was used in connection
with several recent operations. For example, the Russians utilized “passportization” to
try to establish an international law basis for their interventions in Georgia and, recently,
the Ukraine. As one scholar explains, passportization is the “mass conferral of Russian
citizenship to the citizens of other states” which is intended to allow Russia to then assert
it was intervening simply for the lawful purpose of “protecting Russian citizens.”21
Another commentator, Joel Harding, insists that Russia is attempting to use another
form of lawfare against the Ukraine by threatening to levy genocide charges.22 Harding
contends that Russia’s effort involving “the International Criminal Court at the Hague
appears to be the deliberate use of the criminal system for the purpose of creating
propaganda in its fight to undermine the legitimacy of the government of Ukraine.”23
Understandably, some have argued for a kind of lawfare ‘counter-attack’ against Russian
aggression24 (though others challenge the wisdom of doing so.25) Even more recently,
Russian officials— reeling from sanctions initiated by the U.S. in response to the Ukraine
situation— appear to be conducting lawfare by calling for an “investigation of the United
States’ atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II as a ‘crime
against humanity.’ ”26
Obviously, lawfare is continuing to develop as a means and method of warfare in the
21st century, even though every expression of it may not be to our liking. As this writer
has said before, it is useful to think of the law in the lawfare context as a weapon, which
can be wielded for “good” or “bad” purposes. This is important to keep in mind as a
number of emerging challenges are examined.
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news/ pressrel/ press-releases/ update-on-sony-investigation.
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
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31. Michael B. Kelley and Arin Rosen, The US Needs To Stop Pretending The Sony Hack Is Anything
Less Than An Act Of War,  Business Insider (Dec. 15, 2014), http:// www.businessinsider.com/ sony-
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32. Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasure Response
Option and International Law,  54Va. J. of Int’l Law 697 (2014), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353898.
33. Michael Riley and Jordan Robertson, FBI Investigating Whether Companies Are Engaged in
Revenge Hacking,  Bloomberg (Dec. 30, 2014), http:// www.bloomberg.com/ news/ 2014-12-30/ fbi-
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For example, cyber operations present a confounding lawfare issue, mainly because
state practice— so important to the evolution of international law— remains
underdeveloped in the area. For a variety of reasons, many nations are reluctant to specify
their reactions to various cyber events in part because of the continuing difficulty of
definitive attribution,27 and in part because they do not want to reveal their capabilities—
or vulnerabilities— to a global audience.
The hack of the Sony Corporation in late 2014 attributed to North Korean operatives28
may prove to be important for the development of international law and, consequently,
lawfare. President Barack Obama very carefully characterized the event as “cyber vandalism”
as opposed to an “act of war”— the latter phrase often being interpreted as equivalent to
an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN charter which could trigger
authority for violent acts in self-defense.29 The Obama Administration seems to want to
temper the precedent that might emerge, while at the same time vowing a “proportional”
response, a phrase that sounds in the law of self-defense.30
Others argue that notwithstanding the non-kinetic nature of cyber “attacks” the scale
of the Sony incident should make it an “act of war” so that it can be considered “legally
and politically, as an attack on the US itself.”31 Nevertheless, for the near term it is expected
that many cyber events will fall below the “armed attack” threshold, and require coun-
termeasures that are carefully crafted to conform to this complex area of international
law.32 In short,  reactions to cyber incidents are much more likely to be in the lawfare
realm than that historically associated with “act of war” responses. That said, if incidents
persist, the law itself may be strained as victims may engage in ‘cyber vigilantism’ in an
effort to protect themselves.33
That raises an important question: are contemporary challenges sapping the vitality
of the law (and, necessarily, lawfare)? Besides the difficulties presented by cyber incidents,
consider that the concept of reciprocity— which underpins the efficacy of the law of
armed conflict (LOAC)— is becoming dangerously irrelevant in many 21st century wars.
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37. Howard LaFranchi, Why children are the targets of terror,  The Christian Science Monitor
Weekly,  Dec. 29, 2014, at 10.
38. Kenneth Anderson, Laurie Blank on proportionality in the international law of targeting,  The
Volokh Conspiracy (Jul. 31, 2014), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ news/ volokh-conspiracy/ wp/
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Why? Most contemporary conflicts involve non-state actors, and most of them are not
just indifferent to charges of violating LOAC, they actually revel in using brutal methods
that mock the law.34 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)35 for example, uses beheadings
of prisoners and other savagery to intimidate opponents into submission. Likewise, the
use of young women as sex slaves in areas ISIS occupies is employed as a recruiting tool.36
Extremists are even making children targets as a matter of strategy,  a stunning affront to
the rule of law.37
Unfortunately,  neither governmental nor nongovernmental actors have had much
success in bringing the law to bear against such monstrous violations of the most basic
tenets of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Faced with
complete impotence to influence the actions of groups like ISIS, many in the international
community have focused the wrath on such nations as Israel and the United States. To
be sure, neither of these countries should be exempt from scrutiny for their actions, but
at the same time credit should be given for the enormous effort they have made to adhere
to international law.
It does not advance the interests of the world community to demonize nations who
are at least attempting to employ the rule of law, albeit imperfectly at times, just because
they actually take charges seriously. The unfortunate fact is that the most egregious non-
state violators simply ignore allegations and those who make them. This asymmetry in
accountability and, especially, the absence of any reciprocity by non-state actors imperils
the entire architecture of international law in conflict situations. Prof. Ken Anderson of
American University warns:
Obligation without reciprocity risks breakdown [of the rules of war] even faster
where one side is pressed to protect the civilians of both sides put at risk because
that’s how the other side deliberately wages war, not merely from indifference
to them. A system of formal reciprocity in the rules of war (each side has the
same formal obligations), but also independence of obligation to the rules of
war (each side’s obligation is independent of what the other side does, including
if the other side violates the rules) over time is likely either to rupture in crisis
or else simply have less and less purchase as universal rules.38
The seriousness of this challenge to rule of law cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, as
this writer has argued before, however complicated and frustrating it may be to deal to
with these law and lawfare-related issues, it is surely in the best interests of the U.S. and
the world community to do so.39 Far better to employ bloodless lawfare as opposed to
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bloody traditional warfare in resolving the inevitable conflicts intrinsic to the human
condition. Consider now the 2009 article that follows below.
Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 
21st-Century Conflicts?
54 Joint Force Quarterly 34-39 (2009)
If anyone doubts the role of law in 21st century conflicts,  one need only pose the
following question: what was the U.S. military’s most serious setback since 9/11? Few
knowledgeable experts would say anything other than the detainee abuse scandal known
as “Abu Ghraib”. That this strategic military disaster did not involve force of arms, but
rather centered on illegalities indicates how law has evolved to become a— and sometimes
“the”— decisive element of contemporary conflicts.
It is not hard to understand why. Senior commanders readily characterized Abu Ghraib
in customary military terms as “clearly a defeat” because its effect is indistinguishable from
that imposed by traditional military clashes.40 No one debates that the revelations energized
the insurgency and profoundly undermined the ability of U.S. forces to accomplish their
mission. The exploitation of the incident by adversaries allowed it to become the perfect,
effects-based, asymmetrical operation that continues to present difficulties for American
forces. In early 2009, a senior Iraqi official conceded that the name “Abu Ghraib” still left
a “bitter feeling inside Iraqis’ heart.”41
For international lawyers and others involved in national security matters, the trans-
formational role of law is often captured under the aegis of the term “lawfare.” In fact,
few concepts have arisen more quickly to prominence as than that of lawfare. As recently
as 2001 there were only a handful of recorded uses of the term, and none were in today’s
context. By 2009, however, an internet search produces nearly 60,000 “hits.” Unfortunately,
“lawfare” has also generated its share of controversy.
     Law in Warfare
To the best of the author’s knowledge, lawfare as used in today’s context first appeared
in his 2001 essay for Harvard University’s Carr Center.42 At that time the term was defined
to mean “the use of law as a weapon of war”43 and, more specifically, to describe “a method
of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”44 Today, the
most refined definition, at least in this writer’s view, is one that interprets lawfare as “the
strategy of using— or misusing— law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve an operational objective.”45
The purpose of the “lawfare” conceptualization in the national security context is to
provide a vehicle that resonates readily with non-lawyer audiences, particularly in the
armed forces. Historically, the role of law in armed conflict was variously presented, but
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often simply as yet another requirement; one to which adherence was a matter of integrity
and moral rectitude. As powerful as values such as “integrity” and “moral rectitude” may
be as incentives, especially to the militaries of liberal democracies, conceiving of the role
of law in more conventional military terms has its advantages. Understanding that the
law can be wielded much like a weapon by either side in a belligerency is something to
which a military member can relate. It facilitates accounting for law, and particularly the
fact and perception of adherence to it, in the planning and conduct of operations.
While recognizing the ever-present ethical responsibility to comply with the law, how
is it that transforming adherence to law into a strategy serves the purposes of the warfighter?
The answer is to be found by recourse to the work of Baron Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps
history’s foremost military theorist.46 Being a man of his times, it is true that Clausewitz
had little regard for international law as a factor in war.47 Nevertheless he was keenly aware
of the political dimension, and this is the linkage to today’s understanding of lawfare.
Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is a “continuation of political intercourse, carried
on with other means” relates directly to the theoretical basis of lawfare.48 Moreover,
Clausewitz’s analysis of the “trinity” of the people,  the government, and the military
whose “balance” produces success in war is likewise instructive.49 Specifically, in modern
democracies especially, maintaining the “balance” that “political intercourse” requires
very much depends upon adherence to law in fact and, importantly, perception.
Legal experts Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou put it this way in their 1994
book, The Laws of War:
In modern popular democracies,  even a limited armed conflict requires a
substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself
rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe that the
war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.50
Some adversaries see opportunity in this aspect of our political culture.  Professor
William Eckhart observes:
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands compliance
with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal and immoral
and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our vulnerability
here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term our ‘center of
gravity.’51
In short,  by anchoring lawfare in Clausewitzean logic,  military personnel— and
especially commanders of the militaries of democracies— are able to recognize and
internalize the importance of adherence to the rule as a very practical and necessary
element of mission accomplishment. They need not, particularly, embrace its philosophical,
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ethical, or moral foundations; they can be almost Machiavellian in their attitude towards
law because adherence to it, in any event, serves wholly pragmatic needs. Thus, the concept
of lawfare aims to insinuate law into military thinking in a new way, one that rationalizes
it in terms compatible with the realities of 21st century operations.
Legal “Weaponry”
The new emphasis on law in war is something of the artifact of the larger, world-wide
legal revolution. George Will recently characterized the U.S. as the “Litigation Nation” to
describe how deeply legal consciousness has penetrated American society.52 Furthermore,
international commerce depends upon law, along with a variety of international fora, to
operate efficiently. This, in turn, is accelerating a globalization of law.53 As international
law generally penetrates modern life it tends to influence, as other trends have, the way
war is conducted.54 Add to that the enormous impact of 21st century information mediums,
from round-the-clock news sources to cell phone cameras that empower almost anyone
to record events, and it is easy to understand why incidents that seemingly implicate the
international law of war can rapidly have significant ramifications among the body politic.
Commanders today, keenly aware of the devastating impact on operations of incidents
like Abu Ghraib, typically are willing partners in efforts to ensure that compliance with
the law is part and parcel of their activities. It is no surprise, for example, that the much-
heralded counterinsurgency manual55 devotes a considerable amount of text to law and
law-related considerations.56 Counterinsurgency and other contemporary “irregular
warfare” situations are especially sensitive to illegalities that can undermine the efforts to
legitimize the government (and those wishing to assist it) that the insurgency is aiming
to topple.
The new counterinsurgency doctrine also underlines that lawfare is more than just
something that adversaries seek to use against law-abiding societies; it is something that
democratic militaries can,  and should,  employ affirmatively.  For example,  the re-
establishment of the rule of law is a well-understood component of a successful coun-
terinsurgency strategy,57 and has proven itself to be an important part of the success U.S.
forces have enjoyed in Iraq in recent years.58
Of course, there are other illustrations as to how legal instruments can substitute for
military means and function as an affirmative good. To illustrate: during the early stages
of operations in Afghanistan, a legal “weapon”— a contract— was used to deny potentially
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valuable military information (derived from commercially-available satellite imagery)
from hostile forces.59
In addition, although strategists argue that 21st century threats emerge most frequently
from nonstate actors who often operate outside of the law, they are still vulnerable to its
application. Legal “weaponry,” for instance,  may well be the most effective means of
attacking the financial networks terrorist organizations require to function.60 Likewise,
sanctions and other legal methodologies can serve to isolate insurgencies from the external
support that many experts believe is essential to victory.61
A Tool for the Enemy?
While the employment of legal methodologies can create offensive opportunities for
savvy U.S. commanders, too frequently our opponents use an exploitative form of lawfare
along the lines of that arising in Abu Ghraib’s aftermath. In fact, lawfare has emerged as
the principle effects-based air defense methodology employed by America’s adversaries
today. Nowhere is this truer than in Afghanistan where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are
proving themselves to be sophisticated and effective lawfare practitioners.
Specifically,  the Taliban and Al Qaeda are attempting to demonize the air weapon
through the manipulation of the unintended civilian casualties that airstrikes can produce.
Their reason for doing so is obvious: precise air attacks are the most potent weapon they
face. In June of 2008, the Washington Times reported a Taliban fighter’s lament that “tanks
and armor are not a big deal. The fighters are the killers. I can handle everything but the
jet fighters.”62 More recently, Newsweek told of a Taliban commander who, visiting the
site of an attack by a Predator,63 marveled at how a “direct hit” was scored on the exact
room an Al Qaeda operative was using, leading the publication to conclude that a “barrage
of pinpoint strikes may be unsettling Al Qaeda.”64
Yet the enemy is fighting back by mounting a massive and increasingly effective lawfare
campaign. Using the media,65 they seek to create the perception— especially among Afgha-
nis— that the war is being waged in an “unfair,  inhumane,  or iniquitous way.”66
Unfortunately, some well-intended efforts at countering the adversary’s lawfare blitz are
proving counterproductive. For example, in June of 2007 a NATO spokesman in Afghanistan
insisted that “NATO would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians nearby.”67
A little more than a year later, another NATO spokesman went even further, stating that
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“[i]f there is the likelihood of even one civilian casualty, we will not strike, not even if
we think Osama bin Laden is down there.”68 The law of war certainly does not require
zero civilian casualties; rather, it only requires that they not be excessive in relation to the
military advantage sought.
Regardless, NATO’s pronouncements unintentionally telegraphed an opportunity for
lawfare-based strategy by which the enemy could avoid—or manipulate—airstrikes. That
strategy is in effect today as evidenced by a November 2008 report wherein US officers
advise that the Taliban is “deliberately increasing the risk to civilians” by locating themselves
among them.69 In terms of manipulation, consider an incident where the Taliban, according
to an American official, held a wedding party hostage as they fired on U.S. forces in an
“attack designed to draw airstrikes on civilians and stoke anti-American sentiment.”70
What is frustrating is the fact that revolutionary advances in aerial surveillance
technologies and precision munitions have made airstrikes, in the words of Marc Garlasco
of Human Rights Watch, probably “the most discriminating weapon that exists.”71 The
problem is much about perceptions. Accordingly, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary
General of NATO, correctly recognizes that perceptions are a “strategic battleground”72
and wants to “prioritize strategic communications” to remind the world “that the Taliban
remain the ruthless killers and abusers of human rights that they have always been.”73
The Taliban are not the only adversary employing abusive lawfare tactics. In their air
and ground operations in Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009 the Israelis faced a foe who,
according to Israeli officials,  flouted international law in an unprecedented manner.
Specifically, the New York Times reports:
Hamas rocket and weapons caches,  including rocket launchers,  have been
discovered in and under mosques, schools and civilian homes, the [Israeli] army
says. The Israeli intelligence chief, Yuval Diskin, in a report to the Israeli cabinet,
said that the Gaza-based leadership of Hamas was in underground housing
beneath the No. 2 building of Shifa Hospital, the largest in Gaza.74
It appears that based on its experiences in the 2006 Lebanon War,75 the Israelis made
careful and innovative counter-lawfare preparations for the Gaza operation. Besides using
“meticulous technical and human intelligence” to validate targets— as well as employing
low collateral damage munitions in strikes— they also subjected plans to review by military
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lawyers “huddling in war rooms.”76 In addition, Israel “distributed hundreds of thousands
of leaflets and used its intelligence on cell phone networks in Gaza to issue warnings to
civilians, including phone calls to some families in high-risk areas.”77
Perhaps of most interest is the implementation of a concept called “operational veri-
fication.”78 According to Defense News, almost every army unit has specially-trained teams
equipped with video cameras, tape recorders, and other documentation gear. The aim is
to “document the story in real time” while there is still a “chance to influence public
opinion” about the conduct of the operation. 79
Despite these efforts, scholar Anthony Cordesman reports that although he believes
that Israel did not violate the law of war80 and made a “systematic effort to limit collateral
damage,”81 there was, nevertheless, “almost constant negative coverage of Israel in the
Arab and Islamic world, as well as in much of Europe.”82 Consequently, as the German
newspaper Der Spiegel reports, Israeli officials are “gearing up for a wave of lawsuits from
around the world” claiming violations of the law of war.83 Other news agencies advise
that the Israeli government is vowing to defend its soldiers against legal attack.84 Interestingly,
Der Spiegel characterized the expected legal action in lawfare terms by describing them
in paraphrased Clausewitzean language as a “continuation of the war with legal means.”85
Operationalizing Law
What does all this mean for commanders in 21st century conflicts? In the first place,
it is imperative that warfighters reject interpretations of lawfare that casts the law as a
villain.86 A better, more realistic assessment is set forth by attorney Nathanial Burney:
[Lawfare] is often misused by those who claim that there is too much law, and
that the application of law to military matters is a bad thing that hamstrings
commanders in the field. The fact of the matter is that lawfare is out there; it
happens. It is not inherently good or bad. . . . It might be wiser for such critics
to take it into account, and use it effectively themselves, rather than wish it didn’t
exist.87
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Besides the fact that law may sometimes offer ways of bloodlessly achieving operational
objectives, it is simply historically untrue that totalitarians who operate outside of hu-
manitarian norms the law reflects are more likely to succeed. Scholar Victor Davis Hanson
points out that the basis for the enormous success of the Western militaries is their
adherence to constitutional government,  respect for individual freedoms, as well as
constant external audit and oversight of their strategy and tactics.88 Historian Caleb Carr
goes a step further by insisting that the “strategy of terror” of waging war against civilians
nearly always has proven to be a “spectacular” failure.89 In short, adherence to the rule of
law does not present the military disadvantage so many assume.
Next, the commander must be concerned with “legal preparation of the battlespace.”
This means that command must ensure that troops have been properly trained to
understand the law applicable to the operation, and are ready to apply it under extreme
stress. In this regard the 2007 Department of Defense study of soldiers and Marines in
Iraq is troubling as it revealed that only “47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of
Marines agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect, and that
well over a third of all soldiers and Marines reported that torture should be allowed to
save the life of a fellow soldier or Marine.”90
Although intensive training and strong leadership may mitigate such attitudes, experts
doubt such efforts can wholly prevent incidents from occurring.91 Furthermore, Stephen
Ambrose observed that it is a “universal aspect of war” that when you put young troops
“in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that
you wish had never happened.”92 More ground troops may mean more lawfare-exploitable
events with adverse strategic consequences.
This could suggest that the best way to avoid incidents is to limit the number of troops
on the ground. Supporting this conclusion is a September 2008 report by Human Rights
Watch that found that civilian casualties “rarely occur during planned airstrikes on
suspected Taliban targets” but rather “almost always occurred during the fluid, rapid-
response strikes, often carried out in support of ground troops.”93 Thus, small-footprint op-
erations can limit the risk to civilians.
Legal preparation of the battlespace also requires robust efforts to educate the media
as to what the law does and does not require. As already noted,94 adversaries today are
very clever in their relations with the global media, and U.S. forces must be able to respond
quickly (and, ideally, before inquiries are made) and as transparently as possible to law-
fare-related incidents. Relationships with the media must be built in advance as once an
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incident occurs, it is difficult to explain legal complexities or to demonstrate the efforts
that are made to avoid unnecessary civilian losses on a timeline that will be meaningful.
Commanders would be wise to emulate the Israeli initiative by establishing “operational
verification” teams to record activity in real time in instances where the adversary is
employing an effects-based lawfare strategy centered around allegations of war crimes.
In any event, multidisciplinary teams of legal, operational, intelligence, and public affairs
specialists ought to be organized, trained, and equipped to rapidly investigate allegations
of incidents of high collateral damage. Likewise, command and control systems ought
to be evaluated for their ability to record data for the purpose of accurately reconstructing
processes if required.
“Operational verification” teams could be more than simply sophisticated elements of
an information operations effort. Properly organized, trained, and equipped they can
fulfill legitimate public diplomacy needs, but they can also provide near real-time feedback
to commanders as to how operations are being executed. Thus, commanders could rapidly
adapt procedures if the empirical data such teams can gather indicates opportunities to
better protect innocents.
Of course, the availability of expert legal advice is absolutely necessary in the age of
lawfare. The military lawyers (judge advocates) responsible for providing advice for combat
operations need to be schooled not just in the law, but also in the characteristics of the
weapons, as well as the strategies for their employment. Importantly, commanders must
make it unequivocally clear to their forces that they intend to conduct operations in strict
adherence to the law. Helping them do so is the job of the judge advocate.
Assuring troops of the legal and moral validity of their actions adds to combat power.
In discussing the role of judge advocates, Professor Richard Schragger of the University
of Virginia Law School points out that:
Instead of seeing law as a barrier to the exercise of the client’s power, [military
lawyers] understand the law as a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of
power. . . . Law makes just wars possible by creating a well-defined legal space within
which individual soldiers can act without resorting to their own personal moral
codes.95
That said, commanders should aim not to have a judge advocate at the elbow of every
rifleman; rather, the goal should be to imbue troops with the right behaviors so that they
instinctively do the right thing on the battlefield. The most effective way of doing so is to
carefully explain the enemy’s lawfare strategies, and to highlight the pragmatic, real-world
impact of “Abu Ghraib”-type incidents on the overall success of the mission. One of the
most powerful motivators of troop conduct is the desire to enhance the security and safety
of fellow soldiers. Making the connection between adherence to law and that end is a
critical leadership task.
Integral to defensive lawfare operations is the education of the host nation population
and, in effect, the enemy themselves. In many 21st century battlespaces these audiences
are not receptive to what may appear to be law imposed by the West. In 1999, for example,
a Chinese colonel famously argued that China was “a weak country, so do we need to
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fight according to your rules? No. War has rules, but those rules are set by the West . . .  if
you use those rules, then weak countries have no chance.”96
To counter such beliefs, it is an essential lawfare technique to look for touchstones
within the culture of the target audience. For example, in the early 1990s the International
Committee of the Red Cross produced an illustrated paperback which matched key
provisions of the Geneva Convention “with bits of traditional Arab and Islamic wisdom.”97
Such innovations ought to be re-examined, along with creative ideas that would get the
messages to the target audience. One way might be to provide audio cassettes in local
languages that espouse what are really Geneva Convention values in a context and manner
that fits with religious and cultural imperatives.
The point is to delegitimize the enemy in the eyes of the host nation populace. This is
most effectively accomplished when respected indigenous authorities lead the effort.
Consider Thomas Friedman’s favorable assessment of the condemnation by Indian Muslim
leaders of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks:
The only effective way to stop [terrorism] is for “the village”— the Muslim com-
munity itself— to say “no more.” When a culture and a faith community dele-
gitimizes this kind of behavior,  openly,  loudly and consistently,  it is more
important than metal detectors or extra police.98
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that much of the success in suppressing violence
in Iraq was achieved when Sunnis in Anbar Province and other areas realized that Al
Qaeda operatives were acting contrary to Iraqi, and indeed Islamic sensibilities, values,
and law. It also may be possible to use educational techniques to change the attitudes of
enemy fighters as well.99
Finally, some critics believe that “lawfare” is a code to condemn anyone who attempts
to use the courts to resolve national security issues. For example, lawyer-turned-journalist
Scott Horton charged in the July 2007 issue of Harper’s Magazine that “lawfare theorists”
reason that lawyers who present war-related claims in court “might as well be terrorists
themselves.’100 Though there are those who object to the way the courts have been used
by some litigants,101 it is legally and morally wrong to paint anyone legitimately using
legal processes as the “enemy.”
Indeed, the courageous use of the courts on behalf of unpopular clients, along with
the insistence that even our most vile enemies must be afforded due process of law, is a
deeply embedded American value, and the kind of principle the armed forces exist to
preserve. To be clear, recourse to the courts and other legal processes is to be encouraged;
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if there are abuses, the courts are well-equipped to deal with them.102 It is always better
to wage legal battles, however vicious, than it is to fight battles with the lives of young
Americans.
Lawfare has become such an indelible feature of 21st century conflicts that commanders
dismiss it at their peril. Key leaders recognize this evolution. General James L. Jones, the
nation’s new national security advisor, observed several years ago that the nature of war
had changed. “It’s become very legalistic and very complex,” he said, adding that now
“you have to have a lawyer or a dozen.”103 Lawfare, of course, is about more than lawyers—
it is about the rule of law and its relation to war.
While it is true, as Professor Eckhart maintains, that adherence to the rule of law is a
“center of gravity” for democratic societies like ours— and certainly there are those who
will try to turn that virtue into a vulnerability— we still can never forget that it is also a
vital source of our great strength as a nation.104 We can and must meet the challenge of
lawfare as effectively and aggressively as we have met every other issue critical to our
national security.
Question for Discussion
On April 1, 2015 the reputed State of Palestine joined the International Criminal Court
(ICC).  Under ICC rules,  Palestinian membership would allow the court to exercise
jurisdiction over war crimes committed by anyone on Palestinian territory, without a
referral from the UN Security Council. Israel, like the United States, is not a party to the
ICC, but its citizens could be tried for actions taken on Palestinian land. Is this a form
of lawfare? How should Israel and the U.S. respond?
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